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Adverse economic shocks exert an inﬂuence on health perceptions, but little is known about the effect of
sudden positive changes in a person’s ﬁnancial situation on self-rated health, particularly among low
income people. This paper explores the association between an increase in the amount of non-contri-
bution pensions, public cash transfers given to Costa Rican elderly of low socio-economic status (SES) and
changes in self-rated health over time. The analysis is based on data from CRELES, the “Costa Rican Study
on Longevity and Healthy Aging”, which is based on a probabilistic sample of people born in 1945 or
earlier, and living in Costa Rica by 2002. The ﬁeldwork for the ﬁrst and second waves of CRELES was
conducted from 2004 to 2006, and from 2006 to 2008, respectively. The Costa Rican Government raised
the amount of the non-contribution pension for the poor 100% before July 2007, and an additional 100%
after that date. Due to the CRELES ﬁeldwork schedule, the data have a natural quasi-experimental design,
given that approximately half of CRELES respondents were interviewed before July 2007, independently
of their status in receiving the public cash transfers. Using random effects ordered probit regression
models, we ﬁnd that people who experienced such increase report a greater improvement in self-rated
health between waves than those who experienced a smaller increase and than the rest of the inter-
viewees. Results suggest that increases in income may lead to a greater improvement in self-rated health.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
The socio-economic status (SES) gradient in health and mortality
refers to health differentials by income, education, occupation, and
social class: People with higher SES have better health and lower
death rates (Kawachi, Adler, & Dow, 2010; Macintyre, 1997; Marmot,
1994; Preston&Taubman,1994; Smith,1998; Smith&Kington,1997).
SES can impact health through availability of resources to purchase
and manage medication and health services, as well as healthier
goods and lifestyles, and better education may help in adopting
healthy practices and enhances the ability to understand and deal
with the complexities of health services. SES can also inﬂuencehealth
through relative levels of income or wealth that a person has rather
than through the absolute amount of economic resources, or through
the relative socialposition (ranking) of apersonwith respect toothers
(Kawachi, Adler, & Dow, 2007; Marmot et al., 1991).
Among some elderly populations (e.g., in the U.S.), the SES
gradient in health appears less steep than among younger groups
(Deaton & Paxson, 1998; Smith, 2004); it might hold only for certain license.conditions (notable, mental disorders and self-rated health), but not
for others; or itmight have the opposite direction towhat is expected
(Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, & Ribeiro, 2003; Rosero-Bixby &
Dow, 2009). However, changes in pension income, especially among
poorer populations, may have a strong impact on health (Case, 2001;
Duﬂo, 2003; Jensen & Richter, 2004).
Empirically, it is difﬁcult to determine the direction of the causal
relationship between health and SES components, such as educa-
tion, income, and wealth. The association might be due to reverse
causation or to an omitted variable bias (Kawachi, Adler, & Dow,
2007; Smith, 2004). Natural experiments and quasi-experiments
have also been used to control for reverse causation and omitted
variables. These analyses rely on unexpected, sudden, and possibly
large income changes, and compare the health status of those who
experience the changes versus those who do not experience them.
Someof these studiesﬁnd that income increases or losses are related
to some health indicators, but not to all (Apouey & Clark, 2009);
mental health and self-rated health are linked to income shocks in
several of these studies (Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, & Shields, 2005;
Gardner & Oswald, 2007). Several studies have analyzed the rela-
tionship of public cash transfers to the poor with household health
using natural quasi-experimental designs given that they compare
persons or householdswho experienced changes in pension income
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analyzed how cash transfers or changes in pensions affect health. In
theU.S., Snyder and Evans (2006) found that higher pensions lead to
higher mortality because persons eligible for higher income did not
engage in more employment. The quasi-experimental studies in
Mexico (Gertler, 2004) and South Africa (Case, 2001; Duﬂo, 2003)
have found that cash transfers are beneﬁcial to child health. In
Russia, Jensen and Richter (2004) found that pension loss increased
mortality.
Self-rated health has been used as a summary measure in studies
about the SES gradient of health, including some studies mentioned
above (Adams et al., 2003; Cheng et al., 2002; Frijters et al., 2005;
Monden, 2005; Smith, 2004; von dem Knesebeck et al., 2003). Self-
rated health is a good predictor ofmortality (Idler & Benyamini,1997)
and health services utilization (Dening et al., 1998). It is associated
with disease burden and physiological markers of health (Goldman,
Glei, & Chang, 2004; Lee & Shinkai, 2003). It is also inﬂuenced by
psychological characteristics such as sense of control, sense of well-
being, life satisfaction, behavioral intentions on health improvement,
positive and negative affect, and depression (Bailis, Segall, &
Chipperﬁeld, 2003; Benyamini, Idler, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2000;
Bobak, Pikhart, Hertzman, Rose, & Marmot, 1998; Lee & Shinkai,
2003; Schneider et al., 2004), and by the socio-economic context in
which the person lives (Kawachi, Kennedy, & Glass,1999). Hence, life
stressors can inﬂuence the way people rate their own health.
This article intends to explore how increases in incomeamong the
destitute can improve the way people rate their own health. After
a means test, the Costa Rican government provides free access to
public health care services and monthly cash transfers, called non-
contribution pensions, to low SES elderly. The Arias Sanchez admin-
istration (2006e2010) decided to raise the amount of money paid
through the non-contribution pension system. After the presidential
inauguration, the cash transfers were raised from 16,000 colones
(approximately US$32) per month to 35,000 colones (approximately
US$70) per month: close to a 100% increase. The non-contribution
pensions were raised again to 50,000 colones (approximately
US$100) after July 2007: almost 200% increase from the amount paid
during 2005. The analysis takes advantage of this natural experiment
design. Therefore, approximately half of the survey respondents
entitled to these public cash transfers experienced the 100% increase
between the ﬁrst and the second waves, while the other half expe-
rienced the 200% increase. The survey also asks respondents to rate
theirownhealth inbothwaves. Therefore, the article studieswhether
the people entitled to such public transfers and interviewed after July
2007 rate their health better on average, than people interviewed in
July 2007 or before, controlling for confounders.
Aside from non-contribution pensions, around half of the Costa
Rican elderly population receives a retirement pension, called
a contribution pension because formal workers have to make
mandatory contributions to the main public insurance and pension
fund through payroll deductions and mandatory contributions from
employers and the state. Themainpublic fund is administeredbyCaja
Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS, the Costa Rican Social Security
Fund). Thismain public fund is a pay-as-you-go system.Widows and
young children are automatically entitled to the contributionpension
after the beneﬁciary’s death; this is the so-called “inherited pension”.
Someelderlypeoplemaynot be retiredyet and still be contributing to
the Social Security fund through payroll deductions if they have not
made enough contributions. These workers and their family are
entitled to the public health insurance.
Objectives
The general goal of this paper is to study how income increases
inﬂuence self-rated health. More speciﬁcally, the main objective isto determine whether a substantial rise in non-contribution
pensions to poor elderly in Costa Rica made them improve the
rating of their own health.
Methods
We use the dataset from CRELES, the “Costa Rican Study on
Longevity and Healthy Aging”. It is an ongoing longitudinal study of
a nationally representative sample of 2827 adults born in 1945 or
before (ages 60 and over at the ﬁrst interview) and residing in Costa
Rica by the year 2000. CRELES has been approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board (Comité de Ética) of the University of Costa
Rica. The ﬁrst wave of interviews was conducted from November
2004 through August 2006. The second wave started in November
of 2006 and concluded in July 2008. The description of the ﬁeld-
work, and the collection and processing of specimens can be found
in Mendez-Chacon et al. (2007).
CRELES has a complex sampling design. There is an original
master sample of 9600 individuals that was randomly selected from
the 2000 census database with stratiﬁcation by 5-year age groups
and over sampling of older individuals. Within each stratum,
persons were selected using simple random sampling involving
a systematic selection procedure. In the master sample, sampling
fractions ranged from 1.1% among those born in 1941e45 to 100% for
those born before 1905. The individuals in the master sample were
grouped into 102 geographical clusters according to the 102 “Health
Areas” created by the Government. The ﬁnal sample for the in-depth
interview is composed of a probabilistic sub-sample of clusters: 60
“Health Areas” (out of a total of 102). This sub-sample originally
included nearly 5000 individuals and covered 59% of Costa Rican
territory. The ﬁrst wave ﬁeldwork yielded the following non-
response rates: 19% deceased by the contact date; among those alive,
18% were not found in the ﬁeld, 2% moved to other addresses, 2%
rejected the interview, and 2% were not found after several visits
(likely rejections). After non-response, the resulting sample size for
the ﬁrst wave amounts to 2827 individuals. Similar non-response
rates were found for the second wave. All statistical analyses take
sampling weights (inverse of selection probabilities) into account.
Furthermore, 703 persons in the ﬁrst wave and 676 in the second
wave needed a proxy respondent to answer the survey questions.
Given the focus of this analysis on perceptions, we exclude proxy
respondents. We also exclude respondents who died before the ﬁrst
wave, who needed a proxy respondent in at least one wave, or who
had missing values in any of the covariates of the regression models.
The models are estimated using only 1556 respondents, which
correspond to 55% of the ﬁrst wave total sample size and 66% of the
second wave total sample size. Given that we assume that self-rated
health is a subjective measure determined by the awareness of the
respondent to his or her socio-economic condition, the selected sub-
sample of the analysis should not be seen as a problem but as the
desired sub-sample to draw conclusions on.
Variables
Self-rated health is the main dependent variable. The variable
comes from the answers to the question “How would you say your
health is now: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, Bad?” The same
question was asked in both waves. The variable was coded as 5 for
excellent, 4 for very good, 3 for good, 2 for fair, and 1 for bad, so that
positive values in regression coefﬁcients mean an improvement in
perceptions of own health.
A series of other health and perception variables are used as
complementary dependent variables. We choose variables that can
change in a short period of time: disability (dichotomous, having at
least one limitation in Activities of Daily Living ADL or Instrumental
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or more out of 15 Yesavage symptoms of geriatric depression,
Rosero-Bixby & Dow, 2009), satisfaction with life (scale of 4 cate-
gories from unsatisﬁed to satisﬁed), systolic and diastolic blood
pressure, C-reactive protein, High Density Lipoprotein HDL, total
serum cholesterol, glycated hemoglobin HbA1C, and triglycerides.
We would expect that, if the relationship between self-rated
health and income is mediated by mental health, we would ﬁnd
signiﬁcant effects of the 200% increment in non-contribution
pensions for depression, satisfaction with life, and potentially
systolic and diastolic blood pressure. CRELES does not have longi-
tudinal information for stress biomarkers. Signiﬁcant effects for the
other allostatic load biomarkers, such as CRP, HDL, cholesterol,
triglycerides and HbA1C (Seeman, McEwen, Rowe, & Singer, 2001),
might indicate that the processes linking self-rated health and
changes in income are related to other health factors.
As mentioned before, the analysis can be treated as a natural
quasi-experiment because only one sub-group as a whole experi-
enced a 200% increase in their ﬁxed income: respondents who are
entitled to a non-contribution pension and were interviewed after
July 2007 during the secondwave. This population can be considered
as the main “experimental group”. There is a secondary “experi-
mental group” that is composed of contribution retirement pension
earners who were interviewed after July 2007. This is a secondary
“experimental group” because they did get an increase in their
pension money betweenwave 1 and wave 2: an approximate rise of
42% (Programa Estado de la Nacion en Desarrollo Humano
Sostenible, 2009). Costa Rican law establishes that the minimum
retirement pension has to be raised as non-contribution pensions
are raised. This increase is the reason why contribution pension
earners (retirees) cannot be considered as the “control group”.
The “control group” can be deﬁned in two different ways. If only
non-contribution pension earners are analyzed, the control group
is determined by those pensioners interviewed in the second wave
before July 2007, while the experimental group is composed of
pensioners interviewed after June 2007. The sub-sample size for
this control group is 149, while for the experimental group is 136.
Notice that in this analysis, the sample size is relatively small,
therefore the statistical power for the regression coefﬁcient is
smaller. In this sense, among contribution pensioners (retirees), the
sizes of the control and experimental groups are 355 and 315.
If the whole elderly population (who did not need proxy
respondents) is analyzed, then the deﬁnition of the control group is
more complex because it is composed by three different groups:
(a) respondents entitled to a non-contribution pension and were
interviewed before the change in July 2007 during the second
wave,
(b) respondents entitled to a retirement pension and were inter-
viewed before the change in July 2007 during the second wave,
and
(c) the rest of the elderly population.
The size of this control group is 1102 individuals. There are two
advantages in analyzing the whole elderly population instead of
only the control group. The main advantage is that comparing the
experimental groups with the rest of the elderly population helps
in controlling other period effects. If health is better rated not only
by non-contribution pension earners interviewed after June 2007,
but also by the rest of the population, then this result would suggest
that there is another factor with an incidence on self-rated health
aside from the changes in the non-contribution pensions. The other
advantage is enhanced statistical power.
Given the deﬁnitions of the experimental and control groups,
three main explanatory variables are constructed: (a) a dummyvariable on whether the individual was interviewed before or after
July 2007, (b) an interaction variable between this dummy variable
andbeing a contributionpension-earner, and (c) another interaction
variable between the ﬁrst dummy variable and being a non-contri-
bution pension earner. The role of these dichotomous variables is
explained in the description of the regression model, below.
These dichotomous variables are the main explanatory vari-
ables. The analysis controls for several confounding variables: age,
being female, living in Metropolitan Area and in urban areas,
marital status (divided in three dummy variables: being married or
cohabiting, being widowed, and others, which is the reference
category), education (having less than 6 years of schooling), and
self-reported economic situation, which is a scale similar to the
self-rated health scale. Additionally, there is a dichotomous variable
for every self-reported disease diagnosed by a physician: hyper-
tension, hypercholesterolemia, diabetes mellitus, cancer (except
skin cancer), chronic pulmonary disease, heart attack, other heart
diseases, stroke, arthritis, and osteoporosis.Methods
Two random-effects ordered probit regressions are used to
estimate the effect of the dummy variables that deﬁne the exper-
imental and control groups on self-rated health. In the analysis of
the whole elderly population, the model can be represented by the
following equations:
zitj ¼ gd1itþdd2itþld3itþb0þb1x1itþ.þbkxkitþaiþuit (1)
P

ytj ¼ j

¼ Pkj1< zitj< kj
 ¼ Fkjzitj
Fkj1zitj

(2)
The t sub-index refers to the survey wave (1,2), the i sub-index
refers to the respondent, and the k sub-index refers to the number
of confounding variables. FðzitjÞ is the standard normal cumulative
probability function, and kj and kj1 are cutoff points needed to
classify the linear combinations into the j category of the ordered
variable. The term ai corresponds to the random effect of each
individual i, while uit is the random disturbance term. The variables
d1it, d2it and d3it are the dummy variables for being interviewed
before or after July 2007 (d1it), the interaction with non-contribu-
tion pension-earners (d2it), and the interaction with retirement
pension-earners (d3it). We say that there is an effect of the rise of
non-contribution pensions on self-rated health if d (the coefﬁcient
for d2it) is positive and signiﬁcant, while g (the coefﬁcient for d1it) is
not signiﬁcantly different to zero. If g is signiﬁcant and has the
same direction as any of the interaction variables, we can argue that
changes in self-rated health are due to a contextual effect that
affected thewhole elderly population during the inter-wave period,
rather than just the rise in pensions that beneﬁted the people
receiving public cash transfers. If l (the coefﬁcient for the interac-
tion of timewith retirement pension-earners) is signiﬁcant and has
the same direction as d, it means that retirement pension-earners
change their health ratings in the same way as non-contribution
pension earners; thus, it would not be clear whether the change in
self-rated health is due to the increase in the non-contribution
pensions or to some other unmeasured variables.
In the analysis of only non-contribution pensioners, the model
simpliﬁes to:
zitj ¼ gd1it þ b0 þ b1x1it þ.þ bkxkit þ ai þ uit (3)
The set [x1it,., xkit] refers to confounders. Several equations are
estimated sequentially. Model 1 only controls for pension status
(the main binary covariates); model 2 adds socio-demographic
Table 1
Costa Rica. Characteristics of respondents born before 1945, with a response in each
wave, and with no need of proxy respondent, in wave 1 (2004e2006) and wave 2
(2006e2008) (Unweighted n ¼ 1553 in each wave; 3006 observations).
Characteristics Wave 1 Wave 2
Quantitative variables (mean  s.d.)
Age 68.4 (6.6) 70.2 (6.6)
Categorical variables (%)
% Female 52.1 52.1
% in Metropolitan area 52.2 52.2
% Urban 63.1 63.1
% Married or cohabiting 64.8 62.6
% Widowed 17.9 19.7
% Others not in union 17.3 17.7
% less than 6 y of education 55.5 55.5
% fair/bad self-reported econ. situation 56.8 49.0
% with self-report of diagnosed:
-Hypertension 46.7 54.2
-Hypercholesterolemia 41.3 53.0
-Diabetes mellitus 19.5 23.6
-Cancer 4.6 5.3
-Chronic pulmonary disease 15.3 16.9
-Heart attack 3.9 4.7
-Other heart diseases 10.8 15.0
-Stroke 1.9 2.2
-Arthritis 14.0 16.6
-Osteoporosis 9.3 12.0
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model 3 adds self-rated economic situation. We use several
signiﬁcance level: 0.05 and 0.01 for the whole elderly population;
0.10 in the analysis for non-contribution pension earners only,
given the limited statistical power.
In order to explore the mechanisms that might link self-rated
health with changes in income, we also estimate models for each
complementary health variable: ordered probit for satisfaction
with life; binary probit for being depressed and for having at least
one ADL/IADL limitation; and a Gaussian linear model for systolic
and diastolic blood pressure, HDL, total cholesterol, triglycerides,
HbA1C, and CRP; the last two are logged to control for the skewness
of the variables distribution. All of these models are random-effects
models to control for longitudinal data. The sample sizes for these
models are smaller than the sample sizes for the previous models
given that several biomarkers have more missing values.Table 2
Costa Rica. ADL/IADL limitations, depression status, self-reported satisfactionwith life, and
in each wave, and with no need of proxy respondent, in wave 1 (2004e2006) and wave
Biomarkers Wave 1
%with at least one limitation in ADL or IADL.b (Disability) 59.4
%with depression 8.8
Satisfaction with life (%)
%Very satisﬁed 75.4
%Somewhat satisﬁed 20.4
%Somewhat unsatisﬁed 3.0
%Very unsatisﬁed 1.2
Systolic blood pressure (mm/Hg) 143.39 (2
Diastolic blood pressure (mm/Hg) 83.93 (11
C-reactive protein CRP (mg/L) 0.57 (0.8
High-density lipoprotein HDL (mg/dL) 43.96 (13
Total cholesterol (mg/dL) 218.00 (4
Glycated hemoglobin HbA1C (%) 5.75 (1.1
Triglycerides (mg/dL) 168.82 (9
a McNemar test for depressed and disability; X2 symmetry test for satisfaction with li
b ADL ¼ activities of daily living; IADL ¼ instrumental activities of daily living.Results
Before estimating the model that tests the effect of the rise in
non-contribution pensions on self-rated health, it is necessary to
describe the sample that is being analyzed. Table 1 summarizes the
characteristics of the elderly who did not need proxy respondents
and gave answers in both waves. In general, people becamemore ill
throughout the two-year inter-wave period. The largest increase in
diagnosed disease prevalence is observed in hypertension, hyper-
cholesterolemia, other heart diseases (different to heart attacks),
and diabetes mellitus. Table 2 describes the inter-wave differences
in the additional health variables (including biomarkers). Diastolic
blood pressure and total cholesterol were lower in wave 2, while
glycated hemoglobin was signiﬁcantly higher.
Regarding Social Security status (Table 3), only 5% of the sub-
sample reported being uninsured; 39% had some sort of insurance
but no pension, and the ﬁnal 56% had health insurance and earned
some kind of retirement pension: 44% in the second wave were
entitled to a retirement pension because they contributed to the
system while working or because they inherited it from a family
member (typically, the spouse) who died. Additionally, 12% repor-
ted having a non-contribution pension in the second wave. Roughly
half of non-contribution pension earners were interviewed for the
second time before July 2007 and the other half from July 2007 on.
Notice that the median non-contribution pension amounted to
16,000 colones during the ﬁrst wave, to 35,000 before July 2007,
and to 50,000 colones after that month.
Noticehowthecontrol andexperimental groupsare formedbased
on the distribution in Table 3. Table 4 describes the relative distri-
bution of the categories of self-rated health for the two deﬁnitions of
control and experimental groups, as well as for the total population.
Forty six percent of respondents report to have fair or bad health in
wave 1; this proportion decreased to 41% in wave 2. The inter-wave
change in the distribution is not signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level, but it is at
a 0.10 level. This proportion is very similar to those found inﬁve cities
of the Latin American SABE project (Wong, Pelaez, & Palloni, 2005).
Notice that the distribution of self-rated health is concentrated in
worse categories among non-contributionpension earners thatwere
interviewed before July 2007, when compared to the extended
control group that were interviewed during the same period. On the
contrary, the distribution of non-contribution pension earners who
were interviewed after June 2007 is more similar to the distribution
for the extended control group interviewed during the same period.mean levels (s.d.) of biomarkers for respondents born before 1945, with a response
2 (2006e2008) (Unweighted n ¼ 1414 in each wave; 2828 observations).
Wave 2 Tests for differences
in paired samplesa
61.2 0.207
9.2 0.764
78.4 0.196
17.7
3.2
0.7
1.72) 143.20 (21.63) 0.681
.62) 81.66 (11.84) 0.000
5) 0.48 (0.62) 0.731
.11) 42.98 (12.32) 0.012
9.07) 204.81 (41.66) 0.000
7) 6.11 (1.21) 0.000
2.50) 171.91 (84.97) 0.282
fe; paired t-test for biomarkers.
Table 3
Costa Rica. Social security status of persons born before 1945 inwave 1 (2004e2006)
and wave 2 (2006e2008) (Weighted estimates).
Social security status (n) % Wave2
(weighted)
Median
pensiona
Wave1 Wave2
CONTROL GROUP
No pension
-Uninsured 60 4.7
-Insured by contribution (or family) 489 36.0
-Insured by the State 49 3.2
Pension earners interviewed before July 2007 in wave 2
-Non-contribution pension 149 6.4 16.0 35.0
-Retired by contribution 355 22.8 66.0 98.0
Total Control Group 1102 73.1
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
Pension earners interviewed in July 2007 or later in wave 2
-MAIN: Non-contribution pension 136 5.9 17.0 50.0
-SECONDARY: Retired by contribution 315 21.0 90.0 109.0
a In thousand colones (current colones); 500 colones[ is approximately equal to
US$ 1.00.
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health of poor elderly resemble the distribution of the rest of the
population.
The random-effects ordered probit regressions are used to control
for confounding effect in the relationship between Social Security
status and self-rated health (Table 5). The ﬁrst set of models that is
presented is estimated with non-contribution pensioners only. The
effect is measured with the coefﬁcient for the dummy variable thatTable 4
Costa Rica. Relative distribution of self-rated health by experimental or control
groups, in wave 1 (2004e2006), and in wave 2 (2006e2008) (Weighted estimates).
Social security status Self-rated health p-value of X2 test
of symmetry for
paired ordinal
var p-value
Bad Fair Good Very
good
Excel
(unweighted n ¼ 1553)
TOTAL SAMPLE
-Wave 1 6.0 40.5 33.4 12.6 7.5 0.0874
-Wave 2 4.7 36.7 38.3 13.3 7.0
Extended control group
-Int. before Jul-07 in w2:
Wave 1 5.8 39.4 33.7 13.9 7.2 0.000
Wave 2 4.6 32.3 39.9 15.2 8.0
-Int. after Jun-07 in w2:
Wave 1 3.4 41.6 31.8 15.0 8.2 0.185
Wave 2 4.0 39.4 38.8 12.6 5.2
Only pensioners control group
Non-contribution pension earners
-Int. before Jul-07 in w2:
Wave 1 15.1 50.8 22.9 8.4 2.8 0.169
Wave 2 8.2 42.6 36.2 8.8 4.2
Contribution pension earners
-Int. before Jul-07 in w2:
Wave 1 3.2 31.5 38.4 17.9 9.0 0.907
Wave 2 3.7 28.5 41.6 18.4 7.8
Pensioners experimental groups
Non-contribution pension earners
-Int. after Jun-07 in w2:
Wave 1 10.9 43.0 32.8 5.8 7.5 0.312
Wave 2 6.6 40.6 37.6 13.1 2.1
Contribution pension earners
-Int. after Jun-07 in w2:
Wave 1 2.4 32.3 34.3 17.4 13.6 0.801
Wave 2 3.0 30.3 34.4 19.4 12.9differentiates the time of interview (g). The coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly
different to zero at an a ¼ 0.10. Its size remains basically unchanged
after adding control covariates. The sign of the coefﬁcient is positive,
whichmeans thatnon-contributionpensionearners interviewedafter
June 2007 rated their health better (on average) during the second
wave than those interviewed before July 2007. The conclusions are
similar if the complete elderly population is analyzed (bottom part of
Table 5). The negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the dichotomous
variable “non-contribution pension-earner” indicates that, on
average, this group of elderly Costa Ricans report worse self-rated
health than the other groups. The non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the
time variable “Interviewed after July-07” (the g term described in the
Methods section) suggests that there is no change in self-rated health
for the total population among those interviewed after June-07;
however, the coefﬁcient for the interaction between these two vari-
ablesenon-contributionpension-earners and the time variablee (the
d term) is signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level. The size of the coefﬁcient remains
after controlling for the control covariates. These estimates agreewith
the results in the previous set of models that were restricted to non-
contribution pensioners only. This expanded equation provides
a more thorough picture because it shows that the improvement in
self-rated health among non-contribution pensioners interviewed
after June 2007 is not shared by the rest of the elderly population.
Additional models are estimated in order to analyze the effect of
the pension changes on other health variables (Tables 6 and 7).
According to the equations restricted tonon-contributionpensioners,
there is adecrease indiastolicbloodpressure (butnot insystolicblood
pressure) among those interviewed after June 2007. However, when
the total elderly population is analyzed, the models show that this
change was generalized to all respondents interviewed after July-07
(g ¼ 1.678, p < 0.01), and not just to non-contribution pensioners
interviewed during that time (d¼0.095, p> 0.10). There are similar
ﬁndings with hypercholesterolemia biomarkers (Table 7). In the
restricted sub-sample, non-contribution pensioners interviewed
after June 2007 had on average higher HDL levels and lower total
cholesterol levels; however, the analysis with the total sample show
that this changes are observed for the total elderly population inter-
viewedafter June2007, andnotonly fornon-contributionpensioners.
The models do ﬁnd a result that is contradictory with an improve-
ment in self-rated health: people who got the 200% increase in non-
contribution pensions report on average a higher probability of
having ADL/IADL limitations (d ¼ 0.374, p< 0.10) than the rest of the
respondents (Table 6). Including any of these health variables as
confounders in the main equation for self-rated health does not
change the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the experimental group.
As explained before, the most important effect in the analyses is
tested with the coefﬁcient d for the interaction between the time
dummy variable and the dummy variable that refers to receiving
a non-contribution pension in the equation about self-rated health.
The time dummy variable is equal to 1 if people were interviewed
after June 2007, and is equal to zero otherwise. In order to test the
robustness of this operationalization and explore how immediate
the effect happened after the change was applied, we re-estimate
the random effects ordered probit model several times changing
the operationalization of the time dummy variable. Instead of July
2007, we use more recent months as cutoff points: August 2007,
September 2007, etc. If the coefﬁcient d increases when the cutoff
point is postponed, this means that there is a lag in the effect of the
rise of non-contribution pensions. If the size of d remains roughly
the same after the cutoff point is postponed some months, this
means that the effect of the change in the public cash transfers on
self-rated health occurs almost immediately after the change star-
ted to apply. According to Fig. 1, the value of the coefﬁcient
d remains roughly the same despite the change in the cutoff month.
The coefﬁcient is no longer signiﬁcant (given that the conﬁdence
Table 5
Coefﬁcients of random-effects ordered probit regression for self-rated healtha on Social Security status variables and other covariates, in equations with sequential addition of
control variablesb,c
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ordered probit regression with only non-contribution pension earners (Number of observations¼570; number of individuals¼285)
(Ref: Interviewed before July 2007)
Interviewed after June 2007 (g) 0.217 (0.121)y 0.278 (0.120)* 0.222 (0.120)y
Ordered probit regression with all elderly population (Number of observations¼3106; number of individuals¼1553)
(Ref: Other social security status)
-Contribution pension-earner (CP) 0.218 (0.076) 0.096 (0.076) 0.051 (0.074)
-Non-contrib. pension-earner (NCP) 0.513 (0.096)** 0.293 (0.093)** 0.258 (0.090)**
Interviewed after June-07 (g) 0.062 (0.076) 0.029 (0.076) 0.058 (0.075)
(Ref: Interviewed before)
INTERACTIONS:
After June-07 X NCP
(Non-contribution pension) (d) 0.315 (0.148)* 0.344 (0.145)* 0.317 (0.144)*
After June-07 X CP (Contribution pension) (l) 0.139 (0.118) 0.112 (0.116) 0.123 (0.115)
a Self-rated health is coded as 5.Excellent, 4.Very good, 3.Good, 2.Fair, 1.Poor.
b y:p < 0.10; *:p < 0.05; **:p < 0.001.
c Model 1: Only variables deﬁning experimental and control groups; Model 2: Model 1 þ Sociodemographic variables þ Health variables; Model 3: Model 2 þ Self-rated
economic situation.
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2007 or more recent, but this is mainly due to lack of statistical
power because the size of the coefﬁcient remains roughly the same,
at least until December 2007 is used as the cutoff point.
Discussion
Based on this analysis, an increase in income is positively asso-
ciated with an increase in average self-rated health, and the
amelioration inperceivedhealth seems tooccuralmost immediately
after the raise in income takes place. The analyses do not clearly
explain the mechanism behind this association. The immediacy of
the effect suggests that psychological mechanisms might be the
ones explaining the observed relationship: people who got a larger
relative increase in their income (through the non-contribution
pension) might feel less stressed due to their socio-economic situ-
ation and therefore rate their health better than thosewho received
a smaller increase or no increase at all.
The psychological explanation seems more likely than the
resource-availability explanation given the Costa Rican context. All
of the Costa Rican elderly receiving the non-contribution pension
are also entitled to free health insurance, and the public health care
system is still the most widely used in Costa Rica, especially among
the elderly (Brenes-Camacho & Rosero-Bixby, 2008). This plausibleTable 6
Coefﬁcients of random-effects regressions for self-rated satisfaction with lifea, being dep
ADL/IADL limitation (Disability)b, systolic and diastolic blood pressurec, on social securit
Variables Ordered probit Binary Probit
Satisf. with life Depressed
Ordered probit regression with only non-contribution pension earners (Number of observa
Interviewed after June 2007 0.041 (0.181) 0.163 (0.325
Ordered probit regression with all elderly population (Number of observations¼2708; num
(Ref: Other social security status)
-Contribution pension-earner (CP) 0.118 (0.123) 0.055 (0.200
-Non-contrib. pension-earner (NCP) 0.061 (0.141) 0.042 (0.230
Interviewed after July-07 (g) 0.269 (0.122)* 0.414 (0.348
(Ref: Interviewed before)
INTERACTIONS:
After July07 X NCP
(Non-contribution pension) (d) 0.311 (0.215) 0.414 (0.348
After July-07 X CP (Contribution pension) (l) 0.193 (0.194) 0.080 (0.330
a Self-rated satisfaction with life is coded as health is coded as 5.Excellent, 4.Very goo
b Binary variables.
c y:p < 0.10; *:p < 0.05; **:p < 0.01; ***:p < 0.001.explanation is in agreement with several authors who analyze the
psychological dimensions of self-rated health (Benyamini et al.,
2000; Bobak et al., 1998; Lee & Shinkai, 2003; Schneider et al.,
2004). However, CRELES data do not have information about stress
level to test whether this explanation is plausible.
The analyses tries to control for psychological dimensions by
including a binary variable about depression based on the Geriatric
Depression Scale, and an another self-reported scale about satis-
factionwith life. Controlling for these variables does not change the
main results. The new stage of the CRELES study is collecting stress
information with a battery of questions, but the original CRELES
dataset (the one used for this article) does not allow a clear
description of this causal mechanism. The analyses neither show
that other biological mechanisms, especially biomarkers related to
the allostatic load concept, are mediating the relationship.
If the stress explanation is true, these results have several
implications for the observed association between income and self-
rated health. Relieving the poor from socio-economic stressors
eeven partiallye may ameliorate a general sense of healthiness
among the population and may reduce the steepness of the SES
health gradient. Generous welfare systems might then have an
impact in improving population health not only by providing
health care resources to the poor but also by leveling off stress
derived from an unstable economic situation.ressed according to the Yesavage scale of Geriatric Depressionb, having at least one
y status variables and control covariates.
Binary Probit Linear (Gaussian) Linear (Gaussian)
ADL/IADL limitations Systolic BP Diastolic BP
tions¼464; number of individuals¼232)
) 0.229 (0.190) 2.613 (2.205) 2.900 (1.202)*
ber of individuals¼1359)
) 0.212 (0.101)* 1.520 (1.307) 0.511 (0.477)
) 0.087 (0.123) 0.893 (1.566) 0.357 (0.574)
) 0.128 (0.108) 2.135 (1.121) 1.678 (0.462) ***
) 0.374 (0.217)y 0.266 (2.133) 0.095 (0.860)
) 0.118 (0.163) 0.429 (1.721) 0.202 (0.694)
d, 3.Good, 2.Fair, 1.Poor.
Table 7
Coefﬁcients of random-effects Gaussian regressions for high density lipoprotein (HDL in mg/dl), total cholesterol (in mg/dl), triglycerides (in mg/dl), natural log of glycated
hemoglobin (HbA1C in %), and natural log of C-Reactive Protein (CPR in mg/dl), on social security status variables and control covariates.
Variables HDL (mg/dl) Total cholesterol (mg/dl) Triglycerides (mg/dl) Ln HbA1C(%) (102) CRP (in mg/dl)
Ordered probit regression with only non-contribution pension earners (Number of observations¼5780; number of individuals¼285)
(Ref: Interviewed before July 2007)
Interviewed after June 2007 1.979 (1.044)y 14.251 (4.058)*** 4.236 (7.054) 1.691 (1.334) 0.145 (0.095)
Ordered probit regression with all elderly population (Number of observations¼3106; number of individuals¼1553)
(Ref: Other social security status)
-Contribution pension-earner (CP) 0.176 (0.732) 1.609 (2.233) 2.741 (4.967) 0.435 (0.852) 0.023 (0.055)
-Non-contrib. pension-earner (NCP) 0.876 (0.141) 0.118 (2.675) 3.891 (5.947) 0.575 (1.023) 0.014 (0.066)
Interviewed after July07 (g) 2.890 (0.611)*** 19.564 (1.955)*** 0.211 (4.213) 0.694 (0.774) 0.080 (0.052)
(Ref: Interviewed before)
INTERACTIONS:
After July07 X NCP
(Non-contribution pension) (d) 1.151 (1.162) 2.590 (3.687) 5.217 (8.016) 0.662 (1.472) 0.075 (0.099)
After July-07 X CP (Contribution pension) (l) 0.651 (0.938) 0.842 (2.975) 3.588 (6.468) 0.015 (1.189) 0.049 (0.080)
Note: y:p < 0.10; *:p < 0.05; **:p < 0.01; ***:p < 0.001.
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in the analyses. The most important limitation is that the increase
in non-contribution pensions does not yield an exact “natural
experiment” design. The “experimental” and “control” groups were
not observed simultaneously with a “natural” random allocation of
“treatment” and “control” to the experimental units. This “natural
quasi-experiment” design resulted from a particular trait of CRELES
ﬁeldwork strategy: its ﬁeldwork takes place along a two-year
period. The observed signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in the model might be
due to any other unobserved factor that occurred after July 2007,
especially among non-contribution pension-earners. We aimed to
control this effect by including the rest of the whole population as
an additional “control” group and by including possible
confounders in the models. However, there might still be some
confounding effect that could not be controlled for.
Themost important source of non-randomness in the allocation of
respondents into the experimental and control groups is time.
Respondents in the control group were interviewed during the ﬁrst
part of the second wave, while the experimental group was inter-
viewed during the second part. Important changes in health can
happen during a year of their life, especially, among the eldest. As an
example, the analysis of dependent health variables show that the
prevalence of ADL/IADL limitations signiﬁcantly increases among
non-contribution pensioners interviewed after June 2007 (the
experimental group). This is an expected result given that disabled
elderly are a priority target for non-contribution pensions.Fig. 1. Ordered probit regression coefﬁcient for the interaction between time of
interview and non-contribution pension earner, with varying month in the cutoff point
for the time of interview (95% Conﬁdence Interval).Nevertheless, according to the study, these respondents rated their
health better, even though they becamemore disabled. It is difﬁcult to
establish what other circumstances of the Costa Rican context might
explainpossible residual confounding. The “Costa RicanReport on the
Situation of the Aged Person” (Fernandez & Robles, 2008) does not
report any other remarkable change in the elderly population’s social,
health, or economic context, except the increase in the non-contri-
bution pension.
Finally, the Costa Rican Government decided to raise the amount
of money provided through the non-contribution pension system
during a period of ﬁscal expansion, but this ﬁscal expansion has
been followed by the world-wide ﬁnancial crisis of 2008/2009.
Given that Costa Rica was affected by this ﬁnancial crisis (CEPAL,
2008; Cordero, 2009), it is not clear whether the observed
improvement in average perceived health among Costa Rican
elderly can endure for long.
As a conclusion, these results have important implications for the
Costa Rican context. The rise in the amount of money was aimed at
decreasing the proportion of people living under the poverty line in
Costa Rica (Fernandez & Robles, 2008). The results of these analyses
suggest that the effectiveness of this policy transcended its main
goal, having also an impact in the health perceptions of its target
population. This conclusion also suggests that thegoodperformance
of Costa Rica in health indicators might be related to public policies
aimed to the neediest segments of its population (Barahona
Montero, 1999; Mesa-Lago, 1999, 2004, 2008).
These ﬁndings may have implications for other Latin American
countries. For decades, few countries in the region have had non-
contribution pensions (Mesa-Lago, 2008). These same countries
have an advanced population aging process, as well as some of the
best health indicators in the region. Empirical evidence shows that
non-contribution pensions have helped in reducing the prevalence
of poverty among the elderly in these countries. In recent years,
other Latin American countriesechieﬂy, Bolivia and Ecuadore have
successfully implemented this kind of public cash transfers (Mesa-
Lago, 2008; Rofman & Lucchetti, 2006). Although Bolivia and
Ecuador do not have as good health conditions as the ﬁrst group of
countries, the implementation of non-contribution pensions may
help in improving them. Therefore, these results may imply that
countries that keep improving or reviewing their non-contribution
pension system may advance the welfare of their low SES elderly
population, in addition to the reduction of poverty prevalence.Acknowledgments
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